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NOTE
TROLLING FOR TROLLS: THE PITFALLS OF THE
EMERGING MARKET COMPETITION REQUIREMENT
FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS IN PATENT
CASES POST-EBAY
Benjamin H. Diessel*
In eBay v. MercExchange, a unanimous Supreme Court announced
that a new four-factor test should be employed by district courts in
determining whether to award an injunction or damages to an ag-
grieved party whose intellectual property has been infringed. In the
context of permanent injunctions in patent cases, district courts
have distorted the four-factor test resulting in a "market competi-
tion requirement." Under the new market competition requirement,
success at obtaining an injunction is contingent upon a party dem-
onstrating that it is a market competitor After consistent
application in the first twenty-five district court cases post-eBay,
the market competition requirement is becoming an entrenched
doctrine. However, the divergent legal standards used by district
courts turning on market competition contravenes the Supreme
Court's holding that courts should not apply the four-factor test in
a manner that makes the injunctive remedy unavailable based on
broad classifications. The market competition requirement may
solve some of the problems resulting from holdup by so-called
"patent trolls," but at a cost potentially too high to bear The mar-
ket competition requirement may insulate inefficient markets from
meaningful competition and decrease incentives to innovate for in-
dividual self-made inventors, who drive a large segment of
patenting activity. Because the market competition requirement is
without foundational support from eBay and is of questionable util-
ity in incentivizing innovation, its continued use is a cause for
serious concern.
* J.D. candidate, December 2007; M.S. Computer Science and Engineering, May 2008.
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In response to the perceived "holdup problem"' created by the threat of
injunction in patent litigation brought by patent trolls,2 the availability of the
injunctive remedy in patent law has recently been increasingly scrutinized.3
Just as legislative reform of the injunctive remedy in patent law was
gaining steam,4 the Supreme Court addressed the issue head on in eBay v.
MercExchange.5 The Court, in a unanimous eight-justice 6 opinion authored
by Justice Thomas, overruled the Federal Circuit's application of a sui
generis "general rule" for patent law that an injunction will issue upon a
1. The holdup problem exists when a party makes an inefficient threat of litigation just to
obtain bargaining power. See, e.g., N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265
(7th Cir. 1986) (denying specific performance because it would produce an inefficient result that the
plaintiff was seeking only for bargaining power); see also Ian Ayres & Kristin Madison, Threatening
Inefficient Performance of Injunctions and Contracts, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1999) (discussing
holdup in the context of threats to perform inefficiently).
2. Patent trolls have been described in many ways. One popular way to describe patent
trolls is to emphasize their lack of commercialization and their business model of thriving off of
litigation and settlements. See Steve Seidenberg, Troll Control: The Supreme Court's eBay Decision
Sets Back Pesky 'Patent Trolls'or American Innovation, Depending Upon Which Side You're On, 92
A.B.A. J. 50, 51 (2006) (noting that patent trolls have been described as "businesses that produce no
products or services and have the sole purpose of obtaining money by licensing patents they own
and winning infringement lawsuits against others"). But see Terrence P. McMahon et al., Who is a
Troll? Not a Simple Answer, 7 SEDONA CON. J. 159, 163 (2006) ("[T]he line between troll and non-
troll remains unclear."). This has caused renewed focus on finding a new definition that provides
greater clarity. McMahon and his coauthors have proposed a new definition: (1) "First, a patent troll
would be a company that receives no benefit from excluding others because it does not have a com-
petitive product nor does it plan to develop one," id. at 166, and (2) "Second, a patent troll's tactic
would be to use threat of litigation and its associated costs to force others into licensing agreements
without closely scrutinizing the validity and strength of the patent," id. I will use the term "patent
troll" to encapsulate the colloquial understanding as described by Steve Seidenberg above. It is
important, however, to distinguish from patent trolls individual small-scale inventors who may wish
to license their inventions. See infra text accompanying notes 207-208, 240-243. For recent schol-
arship discussing patent trolls post-eBay, see, in general, Leslie T. Grab, Recent Development,
Equitable Concerns of eBay v. Mercexchange: Did the Supreme Court Successfully Balance Patent
Protection Against Patent Trolls?, 8 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 81 (2006); Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries
and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809 (2007)
(analogizing the current patent troll to the gilded age equivalent, the "patent shark"); Rebecca A. Hand,
Note, eBay v. MercExchange: Looking at the Cause and Effect of a Shift in the Standard for Issuing
Patent Injunctions, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 461, 473-79 (2007); Damian Myers, Note, Reeling
in the Patent Troll, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 333 (2007).
3. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 3, at 40-41 (2003) [hereinafter FTC REPORT],
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
4. See David L. McCombs & Phillip B. Philbin, 2005 Year in Review: Itellectual Propert,
69 TEx. BAR J. 29, 30 (2005) (discussing how the Patent Reform Act would authorize courts to limit
the availability of the injunctive remedy based on equitable considerations); cf Patent Reform Act,
H.R. 2795, 113th Cong. (2005) ("In determining equity, the court shall consider the fairness of the
remedy in light of all the facts and the relevant interests of the parties associated with the inven-
tion.").
5. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
6. This case was decided without Justice O'Connor. before Justice Alito was confirmed.
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showing of patent validity and infringement absent "exceptional circum-
stances."'7 The central holding reads as follows:
According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a
permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may
grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an
irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, consider-
ing the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy
in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be dis-
served by a permanent injunction.
The Court was clear that neither the district court's nor the Federal Cir-
cuit's approach to injunctions was appropriate. The district court's
application of its newly created four-factor test in denying MercExchange
an injunction was flawed because it allowed the decision to turn on plain-
tiff's "willingness to license its patents" and "lack of commercial activity in
practicing the patents."9 The Federal Circuit's general rule of awarding an
injunction, reversing the district court, was also flawed.' ° The short, unani-
mous opinion, however, gave no bright-line rules and few guideposts to
district judges. It emphasized instead that awarding injunctions was up to
the discretion of trial courts, subject to the ground-rule that discretion be
"exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity."'
But while the Supreme Court unanimously agreed that equity demanded
vesting discretion in district judges, the justices split on how the four-factor• 2
test should be applied. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and
Ginsburg, argued that application of the four-factor test by district judges
should be informed by substantial Federal Circuit precedent regarding in-
junctions," and that the bounds of discretion should be circumscribed by
reference to the principle of stare decisis.14 Chief Justice Roberts's concur-
rence showed that at least three of the seven concurring Justices thought
courts should apply the four-factor test in a manner more in keeping with
7. eBay Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1841 (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 401 F.3d
1323, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
8. eBay Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1839.
9. Id. at 1840 (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 712 (E.D.
Va. 2003)).
10. eBay Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1840.
11. Id. at 1841.
12. Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring, joined by Scalia & Ginsburg, JJ.); id. at 1842 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring, joined by Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ.); see also Hand, supra note 2, 464-65 (2007)
(summarizing the opposite stances of the two concurring opinions).
13. eBay Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1841 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) ("At the same time, there is a
difference between exercising equitable discretion pursuant to the established four-factor test and
writing on an entirely clean slate.").
14. Id. at 1841-42 ("Discretion is not whim, and limiting discretion according to legal stan-
dards helps promote the basic principle of justice that like cases should be decided alike." (quoting
Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 126 S. Ct. 704, 710 (2005))).
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the Federal Circuit's general rule that injunctions should issue absent excep-
tional circumstances. 5
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, argued
that the historical granting of injunctions should only bear on modern deci-
sions to the extent that the modem and historical cases were factually
similar. 6 Justice Kennedy urged that the business model of firms licensing
patents, rather than practicing their inventions, is a modem phenomenon
that justifies a change in how readily district judges grant injunctions."7 He
cautioned courts that damages might be the preferred remedy when plain-
tiffs sought injunctions simply to extract negotiating advantages or if the
patent covers only a small piece of the accused invention. 
8
Judges will be forced to seek guidance in the two concurring opinions in
order to make up for the unanimous holding's failure to deal extensively
with how to apply the four-factor test. But in seeking guidance, judges
should not rely too heavily on either standard.' 9 The two concurring opin-
ions advocate for very different standards, making it possible that two
district courts faced with the same factual circumstances could reach different
conclusions regarding the awarding of injunctions depending on whether they
lean on the standard proposed by Chief Justice Roberts or Justice Kennedy.
Indeed, a wide span of district court judicial conduct could be legitimized as
falling between the bookends of the concurring opinions' different stan-
dards. A hidden danger of giving the concurring opinions too much weight
is that narrow factual distinctions could form the basis for choosing between
the competing legal standards, in essence stampeding the four-factor test
and replacing it with a binary inquiry-alignment or divergence with the
distinct fact.
This Note analyzes the use by district courts of such a binary inquiry-a
"market competition requirement" for obtaining a permanent injunction in
patent cases after eBay-and concludes that this market competition re-
quirement runs contrary to the eBay decision, is unsound policy, and should
therefore be abandoned. Part I examines all patent cases applying the four-
factor test in the context of permanent injunctions post-eBay, and confirms
that district courts have continued to make commercializing and competing
in the market with a patented invention a necessary precondition to gaining
15. See Sharon R. Bamer & Gregory S. Norrod, A Changing Landscape, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 2,
2006, at 9, 9 ("Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.'s concurrence emphasized that the long history of
routinely granting injunctions should inform courts' exercise of discretion in applying the equitable
balancing."); Mark Vorder-Bruegge Jr., Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement-A New Era?, FED.
LAW., Jul. 2006, at 14, 15 ("[Justice Roberts's] concurrence arguably indicates that at least three
justices are very comfortable with something close to the general rule the Court overturned.").
16. eBay Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The lesson of the historical
practice, therefore, is most helpful and instructive when the circumstances of a case bear substantial
parallels to litigation the courts have confronted before.").
17. Id. Justice Kennedy implicated "patent trolls" without explicitly calling them out by
name. See id. For a competing definition of patent trolls, see supra note 2.
18. eBay Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring),
19. For a discussion of the guidance given by the Supreme Court in applying the four-factor




an injunction. Part I concludes that district judges have created and em-
ployed a "market competition requirement," or phrased more colloquially,
district judges are essentially "trolling for trolls." Part II explores whether
one can reconcile district courts' adoption of a market competition require-
ment with the Supreme Court's unanimous opinion, but ultimately finds a
lack of support for the market competition requirement in eBay. Part III ana-
lyzes the utility of the market competition requirement as a tool for
combating ex post losses due to holdup by patent trolls, and argues that use
of the market competition requirement may itself cause losses in allocative
efficiency due to overinclusiveness and reduced competition. Part III argues
further that the market competition requirement threatens to harm incentives
to innovate, especially for small-scale inventors. This Note concludes that
courts should dismantle the market competition requirement as lacking per-
suasive jurisprudential or economic support.
I. SURVEY OF POST-EBAY DISTRICT COURT CASES:
THE EMERGING "MARKET COMPETITION REQUIREMENT"
Practitioners and commentators have suggested, based on the early
round of district court cases, that direct competition is the key to obtaining
an injunction. Texas practitioners Robert J. Garrey and John M. Jackson
initially analyzed the first four Eastern District of Texas cases applying the
eBay standard and made the preliminary observation that "it appears that
plaintiffs that use their patents to produce goods and services are far more
likely to obtain injunctive relief against competitors adjudged to infringe
their patents than are plaintiffs who merely license their patents. 2' Other
commentators have also posited that direct competition determines
whether an injunction will be granted. Jeremy Mulder surveyed five dis-
trict court cases post-eBay and suggested a predictive model that "the type
of competition between the plaintiff-patentee and the defendant-infringer
determines whether district courts grant permanent injunctions in patent
cases." 22 Rebecca Hand examined four Fifth Circuit post-eBay cases and
argues that competition was the deciding factor in granting an injunction,
21footnoting non-Fifth Circuit cases that appear to follow the same rule.
Professors Lemley and Weiser advocate that courts should be wary of
granting injunctions to a patent holder who is not a direct competitor of
20. For a discussion of other commentators hypothesizing a similar rule based on initial
post-eBay cases, see infra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
21. ROBERT J. GARREY & JOHN M. JACKSON, THE PERMANENT INJUNCTION THREAT IN
PATENT CASES: HAS Ebay v. MercExchange CHANGED THE LANDSCAPE FOR PATENT LITIGATION IN
TEXAS DISTRICT COURTS? 11 (2006), http://images.jw.comlcom/publications/626.pdf.
22. Jeremy Mulder, Note, The Aftermath of eBay: Predicting When District Courts Will
Grant Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases, 22 BERKELEY T)CH. L.J. 67, 80 (2007).
23. Hand, supra note 2, at 479-84 (arguing that four Fifth Circuit cases decided after eBay
stand for the proposition that direct competition is the deciding factor and noting non-Fifth Circuit
cases following the same rule).
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the defendant and find that an early Eastern District of Texas case supports
this position.2 4
This Part tests the hypothesis of these practitioners and commentators by
examining a larger set of every patent case for which permanent injunctions
were granted and denied post-eBay2' and confirms that commercialization
within the invented area covering the patent determines whether an injunc-
tion will be granted.26 In addition to expanding the set of cases considered,
this Part provides a new framework for emphasizing the significance of
competition by first analyzing factors such as inventive area, jurisdiction,
willfulness-which this Note finds non-controlling-before finding com-
mercialization and licensing activity to be dispositive. As of the writing of
this Note, twenty-five district court cases have applied the four-factor test
in determining whether to grant or deny a permanent injunction in cases
where plaintiffs have shown patent infringement and patent validity. Out
of these cases, courts denied injunctions to seven plaintiffs27 and granted
injunctions to eighteen plaintiffs. s
The following tables present data relevant to this hypothesis, including
inventive area, whether the plaintiff had commercialized the invention cov-
ered by the patent and used it to compete in the market, whether the
plaintiff was willing to license the patent or had tried to license it to the
defendant, and whether the court found willful infringement. The tables
group cases together based on whether the court granted or denied the in-
junction. A discussion of the results presented in the tables-framed
around inventive area, jurisdiction, willfulness, and market competition
and licensing-directly follows.
24. Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Informa-
tion?, 85 TEx. L. REv. 783, 799-800 (2007) ("[Clourts should cast a skeptical eye at claims for
injunctive relief where the patent owner is not a direct competitor of the defendant......
25. As of July 27, 2007.
26. District court cases applying the four-factor test in other contexts such as copyright,
trademark, and preliminary injunctions are beyond the scope of this Note, which deals specifically
with permanent injunctions in patent cases.
27. See infra Table 1.





TABLE 1 Technology Plaintiff Plaintiff Plaintiff Tried Willful
Cases Denying Commercialized Willing to to License Infringement?
Injunctions Patent / Market License Patent to
Competition? Patent? Defendant?
z4 Techs., Inc. v. Product activation NO YES N/A YES
Microsoft Corp." / anti-piracy
(E.D. Tex.) software




Paice LLC v. Hybrid NO YES PROBABLY NO
Toyota Motor powertrains for
Corp.3' vehicles
(E.D. Tex)
Voda v. Cordis Angioplasty guide NO YES YES YES
Corp.' catheter
(W.D. Okla.)




IMX, Inc. v. Method and N/A YES N/A YES
LendingTree, system for trading
LLC loans
(D. Del.) I I I I
Praxair, Inc. v. Apparatus for YES N/A N/A N/A
ATMI, Inc. safely handling
(D. Del.) toxic fluids
29. z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
30. Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-264, 2006 WL 2709206 (E.D. Tex.
Sept. 1, 2006).
31. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-21 1-DF, 2006 WL 2385139 (E.D. Tex.
Aug. 16, 2006).
32. Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 WL 2570614 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 5,
2006).
33. Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., No. 02-73543, 2007 WL 37742 (E.D. Mich.
Jan. 4, 2007).
34. IMX, Inc. v. LendingTree, LLC, 469 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D. Del. 2007).
35. "N/A" for this cell and all others means that there is no clear answer in the opinion or in
related litigation documents.





TABLE 2 Technology Plaintiff Plaintiff Plaintiff Try to Willful
Cases Granting Commercialized Willing to License Infringement?
Injunctions Patent / Market License Patent to
Competition? Patent? Defendant?
Wald v. Polymer sticks YES N/A N/A YES
Mudhopper Oilfield used for drilling
Servs.' (W.D. bores
Okla.) I
Telequip Corp. v. Coin-operated YES N/A N/A YES
Change Exch. products
(N.D.N.Y.)




Floe Int'l, Inc. v. Trailer frame for YES N/A N/A YES
Newmans' Mfg. hauling
Inc.° (D. Minn.) snowmobiles
3M Innovative Film for use in YES N/A NO N/A




Rosco, Inc. v. Cross-view YES N/A N/A N/A
Mirror Lite Co." mirrors for school
(E.D.N.Y.) buses
Smith & Nephew, Medical device for YES YES YES N/A
Inc. v. Synthes treating leg
(U.S.A.)- fractures
(W.D. Tenn.) I IIIII
37. Wald v. Mudhopper Oilfield Servs., No. CIV-04-1693-C, 2006 WL 2128851 (W.D. Okla.
July 27, 2006).
38. Telequip Corp. v. Change Exch., No. 5:01-CV-1748, 2006 WL 2385425 (N.D.N.Y Aug.
15, 2006).
39. TiVo Inc. v. Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
40. Floe Int'l, Inc. v. Newmans' Mfg. Inc., No. 04-5120, 2006 WL 2472112 (D. Minn. Aug.
23, 2006).
41. 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., No. 01-1781, 2006 WL 2735499 (D.
Minn. Sept. 25, 2006).
42. Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co. (Rosco II), No. CV-96-5658, 2006 WL 2844400 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 29, 2006).
43. Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 466 F. Supp. 2d 978 (W.D. Tenn. 2006).
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44. Black & Decker Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 04-C-7955, 2006 WL 3446144
(N.D. I11. Nov. 29, 2006).
45. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., No. H-03-2910,
2006 WL 3813778 (S.D Tex. Dec. 27, 2006).
46. MPT, Inc. v. Marathon Labels, Inc., No. 1:04-CV-2357, 2007 WL 184747 (N.D. Ohio
Jan. 19, 2007).
47. Novozymes A/S v. Genencor Int'l, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 592 (D. Del. 2007).
48. Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs. Inc., Nos. 04-1689, 06-757, 06-5166, 2007
WL 869545 (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2007).
49. 02 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., No. 2-04-CV-32, 2007 WL 869576
(E.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2007).
50. 800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex Sec., Ltd., No. 6:02-cv-1354-Orl-28DAB, 2007 WL 1101238
(M.D. Fla. Apr. 12, 2007).
TABLE 2 Technology Plaintiff Plaintiff Plaintiff Try to Willful
Cases Granting Commercialized Willing to License Infringement?
Injunctions Patent / Market License Patent to
Competition? Patent? Defendant?
Black & Decker Consumer YES N/A N/A N/A
Inc. v. Robert electronics;
Bosch Tool Corp." rugged radio
(N.D. Ill.) 1











Novozymes A/S v. Enzymes used to YES N/A N/A YES
Genencor Int'l, produce ethanol
Inc.' 7 (D. Del.)
Ortho-McNeil Patent covering YES N/A N/A N/A
Pharmaceutical, TOPOMAX®
Inc. v. Mylan Labs. pharmaceutical
Inc.' (D.N.J.) products
02 Micro Int'l Ltd. High efficiency YES N/A N/A YES
v. Beyond AC/DC converter
Innovation Tech.
Co.'9 (E.D. Tex.)
800 Adept, Inc. v. Telephone call YES N/A N/A YES
Murex Securities, routing
Ltd.-" (M.D. Fla.) I
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TABLE 2 Technology Plaintiff Plaintiff Plaintiff Try to Willful
Cases Granting Commercialized Willing to License Infringement?
Injunctions Patent I Market License Patent to
Competition? Patent? Defendant?
MGM Well Gas drilling YES NO NO NO








Commonwealth Wireless Local YES, though only in YES N/A N/A






Sanofi-Synthelabo Pharmaceutical YES N/A YES NO




In many ways, the set of cases in which courts denied plaintiffs injunc-
tions are indistinguishable from the set of cases in which courts granted
injunctions. Factors including inventive area, jurisdiction, and willfulness
do not sufficiently distinguish the cases granting and denying injunctions
such that one can tell, given these factors alone, whether an injunction will
issue. As predicted, only one factor-market competition using the
patent-accurately determines when a district court is likely to grant an
injunction in a given litigation.
51. MGM Well Servs., Inc. v. Mega Lift Sys., LLC, No. H-05-1634, 2007 WL 1231682
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2007).
52. Brooktrout, Inc. v. Eicon Networks Corp., No. 2:03-CV-59, 2007 WL 1730112 (E.D.
Tex. June 14, 2007).
53. Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Organisation v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F.
Supp. 2d 600 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
54. Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) formed
Radiata Communications Pty Ltd., with Macquarie University in 1997, in order to commercialize
the patented wireless technology, but Radiata was acquired by CISCO Systems in 2001. Id. at 602.
The court, however, found that CSIRO "does not compete with [the defendant] for marketshare" but
"does compete internationally with other research groups-such as universities-for resources,
ideas, and the best scientific minds to transform those ideas into realities." Id. at 604.




Inventive or technological area does not predict whether a court will
grant an injunction. In the set of cases denying injunctions, the inventive
areas included software, electronic programming guides for browsing tele-
vision offerings, hybrid powertrains for vehicles, angioplasty guide
catheters, tarp coverings, methods and systems for trading loans, and an
apparatus for safely handling toxic fluids.56 In the set of cases granting
injunctions, the inventive areas included drilling, coin-operated products,
DVRs for televisions, adhesive film, mirrors for school buses, medical
devices, radios, deepwater drilling, pharmaceutical products, telephone
call routing, gas drilling systems, fax server boards, and WLAN technol-57
ogy. Both sets of cases include a diverse range of commercial
technology-both high-tech and otherwise-that overlap to a large degree.
For example, for patents in inventive categories such as mechanical de-
vices, DVR technology, and medical devices, courts have both granted and• • • 58
denied injunctions. Interestingly, even when the same inventive area-
consumer electronics for home television-was involved, one court
awarded the plaintiff an injunction, while another denied an injunction.
59
Because no pattern exists regarding the inventive area within and across
the groups of cases granting and denying injunctions, one cannot draw any
meaningful categorical distinction based on technology or inventive area.
B. Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction out of which the case arises does not accurately pre-
dict when courts will grant or deny injunctions. The Eastern District of
Texas has heard seven cases-more than any jurisdiction thus far-and
has granted an injunction in four cases6° and denied an injunction in three
cases. The District of Minnesota has granted an injunction in both of its
cases, and the Western District of Oklahoma has granted one
62 63injunction and denied another. The District of Delaware has denied two
injunctions6 and granted one. 65 The Northern and Eastern Districts of New
56. See supra Table 1.
57. See supra Table 2.
58. See supra Tables I & 2.
59. Compare Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-264, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 76380, at "4 (E.D. Tex. July 7, 2006) (denying an injunction though DirecTV's electronic
programming guide infringed on Finisar's patent), with TiVo Inc. v. Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 446
F. Supp. 2d 664 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (granting an injunction).
60. See supra Table 2.
61. See supra Table 1.
62. See supra Table 2.
63. See supra Table 1.
64. See supra Table 1.
65. See supra Table 2.
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York have both granted injunctions, while the Eastern District of Michigan
has denied one injunction. 66 The Southern District of Texas has granted two
67
injunctions. The Western District of Tennessee, Northern District of
Illinois, Northern District of Ohio, Middle District of Florida, and Southern
District of New York have all granted injunctions, but each has only heard
one post-eBay case.68 Both Finisar and TiVo involved similar technology and
were both venued in the Eastern District of Texas, yet came out differently
with respect to injunction. 69 As such, there is no clear trend at present such
that jurisdictional placement can be used to predict whether an injunction
will be granted.
C. Willfulness
Whether infringement was willful does not bear on whether a plaintiff
obtains an injunction. Although historically willfulness has weighed heavily
on the decision to grant an injunction, it has not proven significant in cases
applying the four-factor analysis. 70 Courts have found willful infringement 7 '
in all but five of the cases in which willfulness was discussed in the opin-
71ion. In cases where the court denied an injunction, only one court
specifically mentioned that infringement was non-willful. 73 Where courts
granted an injunction, they found infringement was not willful in four
cases. 74 On the other hand, willful infringement was found in roughly equal
proportion in cases granting and denying injunctions." The absence of any
discernable trend with respect to willfulness in these cases shows that the
66. See supra Tables I & 2.
67. See supra Table 2.
68. See supra Table 2.
69. See supra note 59.
70. See Mitchell G. Stockwell, Implementing eBay: New Problems in Guiding Judicial Dis-
cretion and Enforcing Patent Rights, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 747, 751-52 (2006)
(offering that judicial discretion in patent infringement cases post-eBay should be informed by the
traditional rule that any hardship the injunction would pose to the defendant should not be consid-
ered when the defendant's conduct was willful). For an example of how willful conduct affects the
availability of an injunction in land encroachment cases, see Ariola v. Nigro, 156 N.E.2d 536, 540
(Ill. 1959), in which the court stated that "if the encroachment is intentional, neither the expense
involved, nor the absence of damage to the land encroached upon will defeat the right to an injunc-
tion."
71. Willfulness refers to whether an infringing defendant is found by the court to have in-
fringed deliberately or intentionally. Knorr Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. Dana
Corp. , 383 F.3d 1337, 1342-44 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc). If so, the defendant may be liable for
increased damages for past infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
72. See supra Tables I & 2. Entries labeled "N/A" indicate that willfulness was not dis-
cussed in the opinion.
73. See supra Table 1.
74. See supra Table 2.
75. See supra Tables I & 2 (showing that 4 out of 7 cases denying injunctions found willful
infringement and that 7 out of 18 cases granting injunctions found willful infringement).
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awarding of injunctions is not dependent on whether the defendant willfully
committed the infringement.
D. Market Competition and Licensing
In contrast to the above factors, the plaintiff's status as a market com-
petitor in the inventive area covering the patent is indicative of whether a
court will grant an injunction. Denying injunctions to plaintiffs who do not
compete in the market with their invention yet are willing licensors and
granting injunctions to plaintiffs who compete in the market against the de-
fendant are consistent with a rule that requires market competition to obtain
a permanent injunction, and thus far courts have followed these practices.
This Note calls this rule the "market competition requirement." The market
competition requirement, more than merely correlating with results, appears
to be dispositive in determining whether to grant an injunction.76 Section
I.D.1 shows that courts have denied injunctions to plaintiffs who did not
compete using their invention and had been willing to license77 their patent.
Section I.D.2 explores the corollary finding that where courts have found
that the plaintiff competed in the market of the patent's inventive area, they
have universally awarded injunctions against the defendant.
1. Plaintiffs Denied Injunctions Are Not Market
Competitors and Are Willing Licensors
In cases where courts denied plaintiffs injunctions, plaintiffs did not
practice their invention and did not compete in the market in the area cov-
ered by the patent." Instead, these plaintiffs sought to market their patent
indirectly, by licensing them in exchange for royalties.7 9 In Paice LLC v.
Toyota Motor Corp.,80 for example, Paice had patents that covered part of
Toyota's hybrid powertrain, but did not commercialize its own powertrain,
choosing instead to profit by licensing the patents covering the powertrain 8
In z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., z4 Technologies claimed that
they had tried to commercialize their product activation software covered by
the patent in dispute, but conceded that ultimately they had failed." In Voda
76. See infra Section H.C.
77. The importance of licensing makes sense, since willingness to license can be viewed as
concomitant to a business model that is not based on profits earned through direct market competi-
tion of the invention. That is, licensing revenues may sustain those entities that do not practice their
inventions directly by, for example, manufacturing a product.
78. See, e.g., IMX, Inc. v. LendingTree, LLC, 469 F. Supp. 2d 203, 225 (D. Del. 2007).
79. Id.
80. No. 2:04-CV-21 I-DF, 2006 WL 2385139 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16,2006).
81. Id. at *2 (noting that Paice "does not manufacture competing vehicles, but rather is
geared toward licensing its technology").
82. 434 F Supp. 2d 437, 440 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
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v. Cordis Corp.,83 the plaintiff was a cardiologist who had a patent covering
an angioplasty guide catheter.s4 Dr. Voda was a willing licensor who had
licensed the patent to Scimed 8 and had also unsuccessfully tried to obtain a
license from the defendant before suing them.8 In Sundance, Inc. v.
DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., plaintiffs had an active business of licensing
their patent, including failed attempts to license to the defendant.87 In IMX,
Inc. v. LendingTree, LLC, plaintiff was a willing licensor and defendant con-
tended that plaintiff "d[id] not provide its technology directly to the
public. 88 The court denied plaintiffs in Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group Inc.
an injunction even though they were a publicly traded corporation that sold
and marketed products. 89 However, en route to denying Finisar an injunc-
tion, the court noted that Finisar never used their patent or tried to sell it.9°
Under the market competition requirement, even entities that appear to
be market competitors cannot obtain an injunction absent proof of actual
market harm. Of the plaintiffs for whom courts denied injunctions, only the
plaintiff in Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc. was potentially a market competitor in
the inventive area covered by its patent.9' In this case, Praxair bore the out-
ward appearance of a market competitor for business related to safe
92handling of toxic fluids and gases. The court nevertheless denied Praxair
an injunction. 9 Praxair may stand for the proposition that assertions of
market competition absent proof thereof may be insufficient, but that proof
of market competition and market harm is in fact sufficient for an injunc-
tion. The Praxair court, in denying an injunction, appeared to be toeing this
line when it noted that "Praxair has not provided or described any specific
sales or market data to assist the court, nor has it identified precisely what
market share, revenues, and customers Praxair has lost to ATMI. ' 94 There-
fore, Praxair may show that, for one court, proof of at least market
competition and possibly market harm is necessary for injunctive relief.
83. No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 WL 2570614 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 5, 2006).
84. Complaint at 1-3, Voda, 2006 WL 2570614 (No. CIV-03-1512-L).
85. Voda, 2006 WL 2570614, at *6.
86. Complaint, supra note 84, at 3.
87. No. 02-73543, 2007 WL 37742, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 4, 2007).
88. 469 F. Supp. 2d 203, 226 (D. Del. 2007). The record was incomplete as to whether or not
the plaintiff had in fact commercialized the invention. Id.
89. No. 1:05-CV-264, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76380, at *4 (E.D. Tex. July 7, 2006).
90. See GARREY & JACKSON, supra note 21, at 10 (citing Transcript of Post Jury Verdict
Hearing at 125, Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-264, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
76380 (E.D. Tex. July 7, 2006)).
91. 479 F. Supp. 2d 440, 443 (D. Del. 2007). There was insufficient information in the opin-
ion in IMX to determine whether the plaintiff was a market competitor. See supra note 88.
92. Praxair, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 443.




2. Plaintiffs Granted Injunctions Do Practice Their
Patent and Are Market Competitors
Plaintiffs who win injunctions practice their inventions and are market
competitors with the defendant.9 In Wald v. Mudhopper Oilfield Services,
96
Inc., the plaintiff was in the mining business and was a market
competitor with the defendant in the area of the invention-polymer sticks
for treating well bores.97 In Telequip Corp. v. Change Exchange,9" the
plaintiff marketed and sold coin dispensers for use in, among other things,
checkout lines.99 The court found that the defendant sold infringing coin
dispensers.'0° In TiVo Inc. v. Echostar Communications Corp., ° the court
found the plaintiff and defendant, who both sold digital video recorders
for home television use, to be direct competitors. °2 In Floe International,
Inc. v. Newmans'Manufacturing Inc., °3 the court emphasized that plaintiff
and defendant were "direct competitors in the snowmobile trailer
market."'0'4 In 3M Innovative Properties Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 5 the
defendant, Avery, sold "EZ Series Fleet Marketing Film" which the court
found to infringe 3M's patent covering an improvement applicable to
graphical adhesives.'0 3M sold competing adhesives for home, office, and
industrial applications. 1 7 The court took special notice that 3M
"consistently refused to execute a licensing agreement with Avery."'' 0 In
Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co.,'" Mirror Lite and Rosco produced and sold
cross-view mirrors for use in school buses,"0 and Mirror Lite manufactured
cross-view mirrors covered by their own patent."' In Smith & Nephew, Inc.
95. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
96. No. CIV-04-1693-C, 2006 WL 2128851 (W.D. Okla. July 27, 2006).
97. Id. at *5 (noting that defendant's infringement would decrease plaintiff's "market
share").
98. No. 5:01 -CV- 1748, 2006 WL 2385425 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2006).
99. See Telequip Home Page, http://www.telequip.com (last visited Aug. 25, 2007).
100. Telequip, 2006 WL 2385425, at * 1.
101. 446 F. Supp. 2d 664 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
102. Id. at 669 ("Defendants compete directly with Plaintiff-Defendants market their in-
fringing products to potential DVR customers as an alternative to purchasing Plaintiff's DVRs.").
103. No. 04-5120, 2006 WL 2472112 (D. Minn. Aug. 23, 2006).
104. Id. at *1.
105. No. 01-1781, 2006 WL 2735499 (D. Minn. Sept. 25, 2006).
106. Id. at *l.
107. See 3M US: Products and Services, http://solutions.3m.com/enUS/Products/ (last vis-
ited Aug. 25, 2007).
108. 3M Innovative Props. Co., 2006 WL 2735499, at * 1.
109. Rosco H, No. CV-96-5658, 2006 WL 2844400 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2006).
110. See Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co. (Rosco 1), 139 E Supp. 2d 287, 291 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
111. Rosco 1I, 2006 WL 2844400, at *4 ("In this case it is undisputed that Mirror Lite manu-
factures mirrors covered by its 984 patent.").
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v. Synthes (U.S.A.), the plaintiff "compet[ed] in the market for the patented
invention."",12 In Black & Decker Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., plaintiff
and defendant competed against each other in the rugged radio market."3 In
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. GlobalSantaFe Corp.,
plaintiff and defendant were in "direct competition" in the deepwater
drilling business."14 In MPT Inc. v. Marathon Labels, Inc., the plaintiff
"invented a method, actively created a market, and established a strong
market position.""' 5 In Novozymes A/S v. Genencor International, Inc.,
plaintiff's subsidiary and defendant were in competition in the fuel ethanol
market. ' 6 In Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Mylan Laboratories,
Inc., plaintiff and defendant were competitors in the pharmaceutical
industry."' In 02 Micro International Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Technology
Co., the court found that defendant "competes directly" with plaintiff. ' In
800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex Securities, Ltd., the court found that plaintiff and
defendant were in "direct competition" and that defendant was taking
customers from plaintiff. " 9 In MGM Well Services, Inc. v. Mega Lift Systems,
LLC, the court highlighted that defendant was a "direct competitor" of
plaintiff."2 In Brooktrout, Inc. v. Eicon Networks Corp., plaintiff and
defendant were "competitors in the fax server board market."' 2' In Sanofi-
Synthelabo v. Apotex Inc., plaintiff marketed the drug Plavix, and defendant
sought to market a competing generic.'
22
The requirement of market competition to obtain an injunction has been
remarkably consistent in cases granting injunctions. Out of the eighteen
cases surveyed where plaintiffs were granted injunctions, only one case pre-
sents a slight aberration where a court granted an injunction to a plaintiff
that was not a current market competitor, though this case easily fits within
the framework of the market competition requirement. In Commonwealth
Scientific & Industrial Research Organisation v. Buffalo Technology Inc.,
the plaintiff, CSIRO, was a research organization run by the Australian Fed-
eral Government, comparable to the National Science Foundation in the
United States."' CSIRO had formed Radiata Communications, a joint ven-
ture with a university, in order to commercialize its patent covering WLAN
112. 466 F. Supp. 2d 978, 984 (W.D. Tenn. 2006).
113. No. 04-C-7955, 2006 WL 3446144, at *4 (N.D. II1. Nov. 29, 2006).
114. No. H-03-2910, 2006 WL 3813778, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006).
115. No. 1:04-CV-2357, 2007 WL 184747, at * 14 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 19, 2007).
116. 474 F. Supp. 2d 592, 597-600 (D. Del. 2007).
117. See First Amended Complaint at 1-2, Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc.,
No. 06-5166, 2007 WL 869545 (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2007).
118. No. 2-04-CV-32, 2007 W[ 869576, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2007).
119. No. 6:02-cv- 1354-Orl-28DAB, 2007 WL 1101238, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 12, 2007).
120. No. H-05-1634, 2007 WL 1231682, at * 14 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2007).
121. No. 2:03-CV-59, 2007 WL 1730112, at *1 (E.D. Tex. June 14, 2007).
122. 492 F. Supp. 2d 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
123. 492 F. Supp. 2d 600 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
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technology.' 24 Radiata was purchased after five years in 2001 by CISCO
Systems.'2 5 At the time of the suit, however, the court found that "CSIRO
does not compete with [the defendant] for marketshare.' 2 6 CSIRO was nev-
ertheless granted a permanent injunction after the court noted that "CSIRO
does compete internationally with other research groups-such as universi-
ties-for resources, ideas, and the best scientific minds to transform those
ideas into realities."' 27 Commonwealth Scientific may show that at least one
court is more receptive to granting an injunction to a research company that
competes for ideas if, at some point in the past, they were a market competi-
tor. Because the facts are so unique, however, with the plaintiff being a
research entity run by a foreign sovereign government-implicating comity
concerns-this single case does not significantly affect the force of the mar-
ket competition requirement's central thesis, that market competition of
one's patent is necessary for an injunction.
II. IS THE MARKET COMPETITION REQUIREMENT
CONSISTENT WITH EBAY?
The unanimous opinion authored by Justice Thomas in eBay supplied
two salient guideposts for district courts to follow in applying the four-
factor test. First, Justice Thomas wrote that courts should not deny an in-
junction if they base a finding of no irreparable harm only on the "plaintiff's
willingness to license its patents" and "its lack of commercial activity in
practicing the patents."' 2 8 Justice Thomas emphasized that any denial of in-
junction based on "broad classifications" was improper. 2 This principle,
aside from being unanimously supported in Justice Thomas's opinion, is
also directly supported by Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion./3 Second,
the unanimous opinion provides that "discretion must be exercised consis-
tent with traditional principles of equity."
' 3
1
This Part considers whether these two considerations can justify the
market competition requirement, and concludes that they cannot. Section
I.A considers whether the market competition requirement can be defended
on the ground that all of the district courts did in fact apply the four-factor
124. Id. at 600-02.
125. Id. at 602.
126. Id. at 604.
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1840 (2006) (quoting MercExchange,
L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 275 F Supp. 2d 695, 712 (E.D. Va. 2003)).
129. eBay Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1837.
130. Id. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[C]ourts should apply the well-established, four-
factor test-without resort to categorical rules-in deciding whether to grant injunctive relief in
patent cases."). Justice Kennedy's support for this principle is notable because his concurring opin-
ion takes the most aggressive stance against plaintiffs that do no commercialize their inventions. See
id.
131. Id. at 1841.
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test such that lack of commercialization did not act as a per se bar to injunc-
tion. It argues that this defense lacks merit because district courts are
adopting a different standard for plaintiffs that are not market competitors,
making it all but impossible to meet the irreparable injury rule and other
parts of the four-part test, and concludes that the availability of injunctions
impermissibly turns on the "broad classification" of market competition.
Section II.B weighs whether the market competition requirement can be
defended as an application of "traditional principles of equity" with district
courts simply utilizing their discretion to carry forward the Supreme Court's
implicit goal. to deny injunctions to suspicious plaintiffs, that is, "patent
trolls."'33 It concludes that even if the market competition requirement is
sound policy, district courts still must limit their discretion by reference to
"traditional principles of equity,"' 34 which precludes use of a market competi-
tion requirement that preempts relevant equitable considerations. Section IL.C
examines the effect the market competition requirement has on courts' grant-
ing of injunctions. It argues that the market competition requirement causes
courts to deny plaintiffs injunctions, and that absent such a rule, many of
these plaintiffs would qualify for injunctive relief under the four-part test.
Section II.C concludes that, because the market competition requirement
contravenes eBay and alters the outcome of the remedy received by the
plaintiff, it should be abandoned.
A. The Market Competition Requirement Employs "Broad Classifications":
Different Implicit Standards of Review Under the Four-Factor Test Result in
a Bar to Injunctions for Non-Practicing and Non-Competing Plaintiffs
Under eBay, district courts are operating within their discretion in deny-
ing injunctive relief as long as the licensing and commercialization behavior
of the plaintiff is not "sufficient to establish that the patent holder would not
suffer irreparable harm if an injunction did not issue."'' 35 In the district court
cases applying the test, plaintiffs that exhibited willingness to license and
did not commercialize their patents received the benefit of analysis under
the four-part test, including irreparable injury analysis. Under this individu-
alized standard, one could argue that district courts are successfully
avoiding the Supreme Court's main concern that consideration of equitable
standards should not allow "broad classifications" to preclude injunctive
132. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 45 (3d ed. Supp. 2006) ("The only
hint of what should have been the real issue in Ebay comes in the penultimate paragraph of Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion."). The penultimate paragraph of Justice Kennedy's concurring opin-
ion is the only place where the Supreme Court mentions the elephant in the room: "An industry has
developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead,
primarily for obtaining licensing fees." eBay Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
133. See supra note 2.
134. eBaylnc., 126 S. Ct. at 1841.
135. Id. at 1840.
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relief.3 6 Of course, this line of justification requires that courts' findings of
"no irreparable injury" for plaintiffs are not based solely on the "broad clas-
sification" that they did not market their patented invention .
37
The market competition requirement does, however, create a "broad
classification" contrary to eBay's holding that irreparable injury analysis
should not turn only on licensing behavior and commercialization, under-
mining this justification. District courts have been careful not to allow
plaintiffs' willingness to license their patent and a lack of commercialization
to appear determinative in denying injunctions and will at least give lip ser-
vice to the four-factor analysis. However, by taking account of harm to
market-competing plaintiffs flowing from the loss of exclusivity and by ex-
plicitly taking notice of commercialization in the application of the four-
factor test and allowing it to drive their decisions, courts have created a re-
gime that allows availability of an injunction to turn on market competition.
This Section demonstrates how post-eBay cases employ "broad classifi-
cations." Courts selectively apply an impossible standard to non-market-
competing plaintiffs causing them to flunk the irreparable injury and inade-
quacy of damages 38 prongs of the four-part test. In cases where courts
granted injunctions and plaintiffs commercialized their inventions, courts
found both irreparable injury and inadequate remedy at law. In cases where
courts denied injunctions and plaintiffs were willing licensors and did not
commercialize their inventions, courts found neither irreparable injury nor
inadequate remedy at law. 39 Thus, the irreparable injury and inadequacy of
damages analysis can be seen as the two pillars supporting the market com-
petition requirement. Section II.A.1 examines how courts implement the
market competition requirement through use of an impossible-to-meet legal
standard for non-market competitors, resulting in a per se denial of injunc-
tions to plaintiffs in that group. It argues that the market competition
requirement, therefore, violates eBay by denying injunctions based on the
"broad classification" of market competition. Subsection II.A.2 argues that
this impossible standard exists in part because courts have gone beyond using
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. Though the Supreme Court in eBay states that irreparable injury and inadequacy of dam-
ages are two separate factors in the four-factor test, they are really corollaries of each other. In Wald
v. Mudhopper Oilfield Services, Inc., the court noted that irreparable injury typically occurs where
damages are inadequate. No. C1V-04-1693-C, 2006 WL 2128851, at *5 (W.D. Okla. July 27, 2006)
(awarding an injunction to the plaintiff after applying the four-factor analysis, and noting that irrepa-
rable harm "is often suffered when the injury can[not] be adequately atoned for in money ... or
when the district court cannot remedy [the injury] following a final determination on the merits"
(alterations in original) (quoting Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians v. Pierce, 253 F.3d 1234, 1250
(10th Cir. 2001))). This Section treats the two factors as one, consistent with how district courts have
applied the test. See Wald, 2006 WL 2128851, at *5; see also 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Avery
Dennison Corp., No. 01-1781, 2006 WL 2735499, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 25, 2006); Paice LLC v.
Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-21 1-DF, 2006 WL 2385139, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006)
("Irreparable harm lies only where injury cannot be undone by monetary damages."); Telequip Corp.
v. Change Exch., No. 5:01-CV-1748, 2006 WL 2385425, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2006).
139. See Mulder, supra note 22 (finding that the irreparable injury and inadequacy of damages
analyses drive the outcome of the four-factor test in the first five post-eBay district court cases).
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the concurring opinions for guidance and instead selectively apply a favor-
able legal standard from Chief Justice Roberts's concurrence to grant
injunctions based on the binary fact of presence, or absence, of market com-
petition.
1. An Impossible Standard: Courts Use Different Standards Based on
Plaintiffs' Market Presence, Resulting in a Per Se Denial of
Injunctions to Non-Market Competitors
The market competition requirement creates a "broad classification"
contrary to eBay's implicit holding that irreparable injury and inadequacy of
damages analysis should not turn only on licensing behavior and commer-
cialization. Courts have applied an impossible-to-meet standard for a finding
of irreparable injury for plaintiffs who do not compete in the marketplace.
The result of district court hypersensitivity to market competition appears to
be a per se finding of irreparable injury and inadequacy of damages for
plaintiffs that market their invention, and a per se finding of no irreparable
harm to plaintiffs that do not market their inventions. Since irreparable in-
jury is the engine that drives the market competition requirement, an adverse
finding as to irreparable injury means an injunction will not be granted. 
'4
0
In cases where plaintiffs did not market their invention, courts have used
this unachievable standard to scrutinize plaintiffs' licensing and commer-
cialization profiles, which upon application causes plaintiffs to fail the first
and second factors-irreparable injury and adequacy of damages. In Paice,
the district court found that irreparable injury and inadequacy of damages
were corollaries and then found that the plaintiff's licensing behavior
showed that damages were adequate.14 ' The Paice court all but announced a
rule that plaintiffs cannot meet when they are willing licensors and do not• 42
practice the invention. In Finisar, the court likewise relied on plaintiff's
lack of commercialization and willingness to license to find that it had suf-
fered no irreparable injury and had adequate remedies at law. The court
140. See z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 443 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (rely-
ing on defendant's licensing and lack of market competition in order to find that any hardships
suffered by plaintiff were "reparable," essentially collapsing the hardship inquiry into the irreparable
injury and adequacy of damages inquiries).
141. Paice LLC, 2006 WL 2385139, at *5.
142. Id. at *4-5. The court stated as follows:
It ... should also be noted that because Plaintiff does not compete for market share with the
accused vehicles, concerns regarding loss of brand name recognition and market share simi-
larly are not implicated.
•.. [Plaintiff s] offer [to license] further demonstrates the adequacy of monetary relief from
Plaintiffs point of view. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated monetary
damages are an inadequate remedy to compensate for Defendants' infringement.
Id.




held that an injunction was not appropriate because Finisar did not have the
capability or the intention to commercialize its patent.'" The z4 court went
even further and created a category of "type[s] of injuries that are often in-
calculable" which covered "lost profits, the loss of brand name recognition
or the loss of market share.', 45 The enumerated irreparable harms all share
the attribute that they can only befall a market competitor. If these are the
kinds of harms that are cognizable as irreparable and for which damages
will not adequately compensate, then it is hard to see how any plaintiff who
does not market its invention could show irreparable injury.
In cases granting injunctions, on the other hand, courts have overtly
stated that commercialization concerns motivated their finding of irreparable
injury and inadequacy of damages. In Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., the
district court distinguished a case that was factually similar, but in which an
injunction was denied and the plaintiff did not practice the patent.' 46 The
court noted that the plaintiff in the distinguished case did not manufacture
products covered by the patent, and an injunction would have given that
plaintiff an unfair bargaining advantage. 47 The Rosco court then found that
Mirror Lite, a counterclaim plaintiff, would suffer irreparable injury because
it manufactured the invention underlying the patent.'4 8 In 02 Micro Interna-
tional Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Technology Co., the court noted that the
Eastern District of Texas has "recognized the high value of intellectual
property when it is asserted against a direct competitor in the plaintiff's
market." 149 In Novozymes A/S v. Genencor International, Inc., the court used
particularly strong and clear language and noted that "head-to-head com-
petitors ... halve] a right, granted by Congress, not to assist [their] rival[s]
with the use of proprietary technology."'50 In Brooktrout, Inc. v. Eicon Net-
works Corp., the competition between plaintiff and defendant "weigh[ed]
heavily in the court's analysis."'' Cases granting injunctions have focused
on lost sales to the plaintiff or a loss in market share as irreparable injury."'
144. See GARREY & JACKSON, supra note 21, at 9.
145. z4, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 440.
146. Rosco 11, No. CV-96-5658, 2006 WL 2844400, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2006).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. No. 2-04-CV-32, 2007 WL 869576, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2007).
150. 474 F. Supp. 2d 592, 613 (D. Del. 2007); see also 800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex Sec., Ltd.,
No. 6:02-cv-1354-Orl-28DAB, 2007 WL 1101238, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 12, 2007) (quoting No-
vozymes AIS).
151. No. 2:03-CV-59, 2007 WL 1730112, at *1 (E.D. Tex. June 14, 2007).
152. Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 466 F Supp. 2d 978, 983 (W.D. Tenn. 2006);
see, e.g., 800 Adept, 2007 WL 1101238, at *6; MPT, Inc. v. Marathon Labels, Inc., No. 1:04-CV-2357,
2007 WL 184747, at *14 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 19, 2007); Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v.
GlobalSantaFe Corp., No. H-03-2910, 2006 WL 3813778, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006); Black &
Decker Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 04-C-7955, 2006 WL 3446144, at *4 (N.D. I1. Nov.
29, 2006); 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., No. 01-1781, 2006 WL 2735499, at
*1 (D. Minn. Sept. 25, 2006); TiVo Inc. v. Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664, 669
(E.D. Tex. 2006)("Loss of market share in this nascent market is a key consideration in finding that
Plaintiff suffers irreparable harm .... ); Wald v. Mudhopper Oilfield Servs., No. CIV-04-1693-C,
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2. Courts Selectively Apply Chief Justice Roberts's Principle that
Loss of Right to Exclude can be Irreparable, Resulting in
Inconsistent Irreparable Injury Analysis
The market competition requirement gets its teeth from courts' selec-
tive adoption, based on market competition, of a standard developed in
Chief Justice Roberts's concurring opinion for irreparable injury analysis.
The Chief Justice wrote in his concurring opinion in eBay that precedent
had favored granting injunctions upon a showing of validity and infringe-
ment because protecting one's right to exclude with damages was
difficult.'53 Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that the difficulty of enforc-
ing one's right to exclude often manifests itself as irreparable injury and
inadequacy of damages.5 4 The Chief Justice emphasized that this histori-
cal practice did not amount to an entitlement of an injunction, but that the
historical practice and precedent should guide and inform application of
the four-part test. 51 Commentators argue that Chief Justice Roberts con-
templated that application of the standard should produce results similar to
those reached under the Federal Circuit's analysis, with injunctions issuing
routinely. 
56
District courts have embraced Justice Roberts's reasoning, but only
when the plaintiff and defendant are competitors in the area covered by the
patent. Cases denying injunctions to non-market competitors apply an in-
consistent irreparable injury standard and omit the standard recited for
plaintiffs who are market competitors, where the right to exclude has been
a substantial consideration. One can observe this by looking at the set of
district court cases decided post-eBay. In cases where plaintiffs have
commercialized their inventions, courts have either explicitly or implicitly
adopted Chief Justice Roberts's suggestion that courts lean heavily on
substantial precedent that irreparable and uncompensable harm flows from
the loss of the right to exclude. 17 Telequip illustrates the standard used in
2006 WL 2128851, at *5 (W.D. Okla. July 27, 2006). But cf Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 479 F.
Supp. 2d 440, 443-44 (D. Del. 2007) (denying an injunction to a plaintiff who did not supply proof
of lost market share, revenues, or customers).
153. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concur-
ring) (noting the difficulty of protecting a right to exclude through monetary remedies).
154. Id. ("[This] difficulty ... often implicates the first two factors [irreparable injury and
adequacy of remedy at law] of the traditional four-factor test.").
155. Id. at 1842 ("When it comes to discerning and applying those standards . . . 'a page of
history is worth a volume of logic.'" (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345,
349(1921))).
156. Barner & Norrod, supra note 15, at 12; Seidenberg, supra note 2, at 54 ("The concur-
rence of Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.... stressed that the new four-part test should produce
much the same results as the old Federal Circuit test."); Vorder-Bruegge Jr., supra note 15, at 15
("Chief Justice Roberts' concurrence suggests that future application of the new four-part test should
still be guided by historical precedent favoring injunctions .... ).
157. In 3M, the district court's analysis of irreparable injury cited precedent that endorsed
Chief Justice Roberts's principle that damages are often inadequate and injury is often irreparable
when one's right to exclude is compromised. 3M Innovative Props. Co., 2006 WL 2735499, at * 1.
In Smith & Nephew, the court repeated the standard from Telequip and added that defendant had
"violated Plaintiff's exclusionary right in a manner that cannot be compensated adequately through
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cases granting injunctions. The Telequip court relied on precedent that
patents derive their value from the right to exclude, and therefore, dam-
ages would be inadequate because loss of the right to exclude constituted
irreparable injury.58 The 3M court likewise highlighted the general inade-
quacy of providing money damages to address continuing infringement."9
The Novozymes court directly equated irreparable harm with infringement
of the right to exclude, and explicitly stated that "eBay did not state that
loss of the right to exclude could not be irreparable harm.' ' ' 6 In Black &
Decker, the court went even further, holding that loss of right to exclude
deserved special consideration when the plaintiff was a market competi-
tor. 161
Courts apply a lenient standard when plaintiffs are market competitors
and apply a standard that is impossible to meet when plaintiffs are not
market competitors, resulting in an essentially per se denial of injunction
to them. Compare the reliance on the irreparable consequences of losing
one's right to exclude with the standard applied in cases where plaintiffs
were not market competitors and courts denied injunctions. In the latter
cases, courts have not adopted the standard from Chief Justice Roberts's
concurrence, or even indirectly intimated that the withholding of the right
to exclude causes irreparable harm or could lead to inadequacy of dam-
ages. Instead, courts confronted with non-market-competing plaintiffs
have utilized language explicitly repudiating the proposition that in-
162fringement of the right to exclude constitutes irreparable injury. Both
pecuniary damages." Smith & Nephew, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 984. The Transocean court re-emphasized
a point found in Chief Justice Roberts's concurrence that "the right to exclude remains a relevant
issue for courts to consider when weighing the equities." Transocean, 2006 WL 3813778, at *3.
158. Telequip Corp. v. Change Exch., No. 5:01-CV-1748, 2006 WL 2385425, at *2 (N.D.N.Y.
Aug. 15, 2005) ("[Clourts have held that monetary damages are not an adequate remedy against
future infringement because 'the principal value of a patent is its statutory right to exclude.'" (quot-
ing Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 397 F. Supp 2d 537, 546 (D. Del.
2005))).
159. 3M Innovative Props. Co., 2006 WL 2735499, at * I ("[W]here the infringing device will
continue to infringe and thus damage Plaintiffs in the future, monetary damages are generally con-
sidered to be inadequate'" (quoting Schneider (Europe) AG v. Scimed Life Sys., Inc., 852 F. Supp.
813, 861 (D. Minn. 1994))).
160. Novozymes A/S v. Genencor Int'l, Inc., 474 E Supp. 2d 592, 612 (D. Del. 2007); cf 800
Adept, Inc. v. Murex Sec., Ltd., No. 6:02-cv-1354-Orl-28DAB, 2007 WL 1101238, at *6 (M.D. Fla.
Apr. 12, 2007) ("[l]rreparable harm flows from a competitor's attempts to usurp the pioneering
company's market position and goodwill.").
161. Black & Decker Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 04--C-7955, 2006 WL 3446144,
at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2006).
162. IMX, Inc. v. LendingTree, LLC, 469 F. Supp. 2d 203, 225 (D. Del. 2007); Sundance, Inc.
v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., No. 02-73543, 2007 WL 37742, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 4, 2007) (hold-
ing that damages allegedly flowing from loss of the right to exclude "does not establish an
inadequate remedy at law"); Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-21 1-DF, 2006 WL
2385139, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006); z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437,
441 (E.D. Tex. 2006). The Finisar court likewise rebuffed application of Chief Justice Roberts's
touchstone that losing exclusion be an irreparable injury in itself. Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group,
Inc., No. 1:05-CV-264, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76380 (E.D. Tex. July 7, 2006). Practitioners, commenting
on Finisar, noted that the district judge had denied plaintiffs their ability to show irreparable injury
and inadequate remedy from losing the exclusivity of their patent. GARREY & JACKSON, supra note
21, at 10 ("Judge Clark rejected Finisar's argument that the right to exclude others from using their
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Paice and z4 drew a line in the sand by holding that deprivation of the• • 163
right to exclude does not warrant an injunction.
The IMX court used particularly strong language to hold that loss of
one's right to exclude did not even constitute evidence of irreparable
harm.' 6' These results demonstrate an impossible standard that non market-
competitors face when courts "apply" the four-factor test. Plaintiffs that
market their invention receive favored treatment and easy access to the in-
junctive remedy, and those plaintiffs that do not may find the standard
applied to them insurmountable. Such a result-the manifestation of the
market competition requirement in action-is a misapplication of the four-
part test and undermines the Supreme Court's majority opinion in eBay by
relying on overly broad classifications.
B. District Courts are "Trolling for Trolls" but Are
Ignoring Equitable Considerations
The Supreme Court envisioned the four-factor test to reflect longstand-• • 165
ing equitable principles aimed at recalibrating the injunctive remedy in
patent law to conform with other areas of the law,166 but district courts have
failed to account for major equitable considerations in their application of
the market competition requirement. First, the starting point for equitable
administration of justice requires avoiding the use of "broad classifications"
that short-circuit evenhanded application of the test. Second, if courts are
really to utilize the four-factor test in the service of aligning the injunctive
remedy in patent law with other areas of law, then they should not subvert
that goal by ignoring equitable willfulness doctrine that has emerged with
respect to the injunctive remedy in other areas of the law. The Supreme
Court's repudiation of the Federal Circuit's general injunction-granting rule
in favor of applying "traditional principles of equity" should have been a
sign to district judges that creating sui generis requirements in patent law to
obtain injunctive relief was off limits. However, this is exactly what district
courts have done with the market competition requirement. Ironically, if this
trend continues, this recalibration of remedies could end up leaving reme-
dies in patent law seriously misaligned with other areas of the law.
patent 'could be priceless.'" (quoting Transcript of Post Jury Verdict Hearing, supra note 90, at
123)).
163. Paice, 2006 WL 2385139, at *5 ("Infringing one's right to exclude ... is insufficient to
warrant injunctive relief."); z4, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 441 ("[A] violation of the right to exclude does
not inevitably lead to the conclusion that a patent holder cannot be adequately compensated by
remedies at law such as monetary damages without first applying the principles of equity.").
164. IMX, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 225 (finding that plaintiff's contention that it suffered irreparable
harm in the form of loss of its exclusive right amounted to "no evidence of irreparable harm").
165. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006) ("According to well-
established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor
test before a court may grant such relief.").
166. Id. at 1840.
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The Supreme Court's holding in eBay empowered district courts to issue
injunctions according to their equitable discretion. 67 District courts arguably
have discretion to find that equity favors denying injunctions to willing li-
censors who, because they don't practice their invention and make a
business out of collecting licensing fees, can be made whole by damages.
Justice Kennedy advocated for this expansive view of district court discre-
tion in his concurrence and implored district judges to be wary of plaintiffs
asserting patents in order to obtain a license fee yet who were not market• 68
competitors. Justice Kennedy noted that in certain circumstances, the pub-
lic interest favored awarding plaintiffs damages rather than injunctions. 69
When a district court, then, disarms a plaintiff that it views as a nuisance
holdup artist by denying an injunction, it is arguably operating within its
discretion.
District court discretion, regardless of whether it is exercised to admira-
ble ends, is nonetheless cabined by the Supreme Court's central holding in
eBay that discretion must be congruent with traditional principles of eq-
uity.7 ° Two lessons from the opinion provide useful guidance. First,
referring to per se denials of injunctions to noncommercial willing licensors,
the Supreme Court stated that any use of "broad classifications" in the four-
factor analysis contravened traditional principles of equity. 7' District courts'
adoption of a market competition requirement that relies on "broad classifi-
cations" of market activity runs afoul of this constraint. Second, the
Supreme Court held that traditional principles of equity should apply
equally "in patent disputes no less than in other cases governed by such
standards."'172 The implication is that traditional principles of equity exist not
only in the body of cases discussing the injunctive remedy in patent law, but
also in the larger body of cases dealing with the injunctive remedy more
generally.
One of the most well-known equitable principles regarding specific
remedies7 3 is that when infringement is willful, equity may require that
courts ignore the defendant's hardship. One commentator, in suggesting that
courts could use willfulness determinations to guide district court discretion
post-eBay, found it a nearly universal principle of equity that courts do not
167. Id. at 1841 ("[T]he decision whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the
equitable discretion of the district courts....").
168. Id. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[F]irms use patents not as a basis for producing
and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.").
169. Id. ("When the patented invention is but a small component of the product ... legal
damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve
the public interest.").
170. Id. at 1841.
171. Id. at 1840; see also supra Section II.A.
172. eBaylnc., 126 S. Ct. at 1841.
173. As opposed to substitutionary remedies, which seek to compensate the plaintiff or pro-
vide the plaintiff with a substitute to redress what she has lost, specific remedies seek to prevent the
harm from occurring in the first place or to give back to the plaintiff the specific thing she has lost.
Colleen P. Murphy, Money as a "Specific" Remedy, 58 ALA. L. REV. 119, 134 (2006).
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balance hardships if defendant's conduct was willful. 7 4 Courts more gener-
ally recognize that balancing tests avoid the harsh results of rigid application
of the law upon an innocent defendant, but the reason for mitigating harsh
results is absent when a defendant's conduct was willful.171 Courts have also
recognized that should they award specific relief, equity requires discount-
ing the defendant's alleged hardship where the defendant's conduct was
willfuil.
176
Though discounting the hardship of a willful wrongdoer is one of the
most widely recognized equitable doctrines, district courts denying injunc-
tions post-eBay are conspicuously not applying it.177 While courts have
found willful infringement in eleven cases post-eBay, this finding has failed
to make its way into the four-factor analysis and has failed to shape the
hardship considerations in particular. 17 Instead, the market competition re-
quirement has trumped willfulness considerations. Because the market
competition requirement does not allow for application of this important
equitable doctrine, it violates eBay's command to apply "traditional princi-
ples of equity."
C. The Market Competition Requirement as Causation
The market competition requirement, because it precludes equitable
considerations such as willfulness and relies on broad classifications, has a
real and salient effect on those plaintiffs denied injunctive relief. Were
courts to abandon the market competition requirement in favor of even-
handed application of the four-factor test with full force given to willfulness
considerations, the likely result is that at least some plaintiffs for whom courts
denied injunctions would have been granted injunctions. First, if the rigid
market competition requirement were gone, plaintiffs seeking injunctions
against willful infringers would be able to eliminate from consideration any
hardship that the defendant might claim under an injunction. 79 Second,
174. Stockwell, supra note 70, at 751 ("In virtually all areas of law, when considering injunc-
tive relief 'a court need not balance the hardship when a defendant's conduct has been willful.'"
(quoting United States v. Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d 1329, 1358 (5th Cir. 1996))).
175. See id. ("'A court balances equities to avoid harsh results that strict application of law
could inflict on a blameless party,' but policies that aim to protect innocent defendants and allow
them 'to show undue harm from strict legal enforcement are not present' in the case of willful con-
duct" (quoting Louis W. Epstein Family P'ship v. KMART Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 769-70 (3d Cir.
1994))).
176. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Church & Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325, 1333 (7th Cir. 1977).
There is also a body of cases that has held that in land encroachment cases, where the encroachment
was willful, hardship to defendant should not be considered even if damage to the plaintiff is slight.
See, e.g., Ariola v. Nigro, 156 N.E.2d 536, 540 (I11. 1959) (collecting cases discussing the standard
that willful encroachment leads to an injunction, even when the injunction would be costly to defen-
dant and would only benefit plaintiff slightly).
177. See supra Table 1.
178. See id. Willful infringement was found in four cases where the injunction was denied,
but this did not affect the analysis under the four-factor test. See id.
179. See supra notes 173-176 and accompanying text.
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without the market competition requirement, "broad classifications" and im-
possible standards for irreparable injury and inadequacy of damages analysis,
inequitable on their face, would disappear.'8s This would allow non-market-
competing plaintiffs to enjoy the same favorable finding as other plaintiffs of
irreparable injury from loss of the right to exclude, as described in Chief
Justice Roberts's opinion. This would be especially important for plaintiffs
seeking to enjoin willful infringers, as the loss of the right to exclude would
carry extra weight to fill the void left by the removal of the hardship factor.
z4 is a good example of a case that may have come out differently in the
absence of a market competition requirement. The court relied heavily on
the substantial hardship to Microsoft in terms of resources and cost which
would befall them if an injunction issued, but did not consider that this
hardship was one brought about by Microsoft's own willful infringement."'
Without the market competition requirement, however, courts would pre-
clude from consideration Microsoft's hardships under an injunction because
of the willful nature of their wrong. z4's hardship, even if only "limited" in
the court's view, would make this factor favor z4. The remaining factors
left to be considered would be irreparable injury and inadequacy of dam-
ages, as the z4 court assigned little weight to the public interest factor.8 3
Without the market competition requirement, the impossible standard as to
irreparable injury and inadequacy of damages would vanish, giving z4 an
opportunity to persuade the court that its inability to exclude Microsoft, a
potential licensee, from using its patent without permission was itself an
irreparable injury not compensable by damages.'m z4, therefore, would have
a realistic chance of showing irreparable injury and inadequacy of damages
by using the same standard afforded to market-competing plaintiffs for
whom courts do award injunctions. By showing that the hardship, irrepara-
ble injury, and adequacy of damage factors favor them, plaintiffs' odds of
obtaining an injunction would be vastly improved as compared to under the
market competition requirement. Courts, therefore, should abandon the
market competition requirement in favor of an even-handed application of
the four-factor test both because the market competition requirement defies
eBay and is outcome determinative.
180. See supra Section H.A. 1.
181. See z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 442-43 (E.D. Tex. 2006)
(noting that it was "quite likely" that the "resources, time, and expense required to redesign its Win-
dows and Office software products would create a significant hardship on Microsoft").
182. Id. at 443.
183. See id. at 444 (noting that the public interest weighed "only slightly" in favor of plain-
tiff).
184. The court's original argument that plaintiff would not be harmed because it wasn't losing




Il1. Is THE MARKET COMPETITION REQUIREMENT DESIRABLE?
Whether or not the market competition requirement comports with the
Supreme Court's message in eBay, district courts' creation of this standard
may be defensible if it leads to desirable results. However, the market
competition requirement cannot be justified on policy grounds. Superfi-
cially, the market competition requirement appears to lead to good
outcomes; courts award injunctions to plaintiffs that are market competi-
tors and are losing market share to firms that have infringed on their
invention, while keeping trolls at bay by denying injunctions plaintiffs that
attempt to use patents only as part of a profit-making holdup scheme. But
even from an ex post perspective, rote application of the market competi-
tion requirement may fall short of allocative efficiency. Possible losses due
to overinclusiveness caused by classification errors and decreased compe-
tition may negatively impact allocative efficiency. More importantly, even
if the market competition requirement leads to ex post gains, its applica-
tion may prevent socially optimal levels of innovation by lowering the
expected monetary value associated with patent rights and decreasing pat-
entee leverage, thereby curbing ex ante incentives to innovate. Sections
III.A and III.B consider, in turn, the effects that the market competition
rule might have on ex post allocative efficiency and on ex ante incentives
to innovate.
A. The Market Competition Requirement Reduces the Holdup Problem,
but Poses Additional Problems that May Prevent
Ex Post Allocative Efficiency
This Section examines how the market competition requirement ad-
dresses problems associated with holdup in patent cases, but concludes
that questions regarding the market competition requirement's overinclu-
siveness and its effects on competition may counsel against its continued
use. Ex post allocative efficiency is achieved when an allocation of re-
sources "is impossible unambiguously to improve upon."' 85 A major part of
efficient allocation of resources that arises in the context of patent lawsuits
is the need to "minimiz[e] the losses suffered by the litigating parties."'
' 86
When holdup occurs, one party threatens to produce an outcome that
would harm the other party in order to gain a bargaining advantage."" The
classic holdup problem exists when the threat takes the form of one party
saying, "I will do something that hurts you more than it helps me unless
you pay me not to.' ', 8 The threat of an injunction gives the plaintiff an
185. ALAN V. DEARDORFF, GLOSSARY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, http://www-
personal.umich.edu/-alandear/glossary/e.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2007) (defining "Efficient allo-
cation").
186. Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1517, 1545 (2003).
187. See supra note 1.
188. Ayres & Madison, supra note 1, at 46.
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enormous amount of bargaining power which, when wielded by the threat-
ening party, exacerbates the holdup problem.' 9 Whether the threatening
party succeeds in extracting payment or follows through on the inefficient
threat, the result is a less than optimal allocation of resources ex post. Sec-
tion III.A.1 discusses the problem of holdup in patent law. Section III.A.2
reexamines the market competition requirement as an attempt to address
the problem of holdup. Section III.A.3 concludes that the market competi-
tion requirement may not be well suited to combat the holdup problem
because it may transfer wealth from small-scale inventors to established
firms and may reduce competition.
1. The Holdup Problem in Patent Law
To the extent that holdup in patent law decreases ex post allocative ef-
ficiency, solutions targeted at improving allocative efficiency may not
yield better results unless they properly identify would-be holdup artists.
Commentators have characterized the holdup problem in intellectual prop-
erty as especially acute because of the emergence of so-called "patent
trolls" that utilize the threat of injunction in hopes of obtaining lucrative
settlements.19° Of specific concern to some commentators is when "patent
trolls game the system in an effort to capture not only the value of their
inventions, but the value of complementary assets and irreversible invest-
ments."' 9' In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy cited an FTC report
emphasizing that holdup in patent cases was particularly wasteful in terms
of social costs because, among other things, (1) the firm practicing the
invention will be willing to pay a higher license than they would have
been prior to sinking costs into the invention; (2) if the settlement sought
amounts to less than the cost of litigation, the practicing entity may be
willing to settle even when the patent alleged to have been infringed is
likely invalid; and (3) the result of holdup by patent trolls is the transfer of
wealth from the practicing entity that is actually engaged in innovation to
the troll that receives a windfall out of proportion with the benefit it has
provided consumers.'92
In addition to the problem of coerced settlements and socially wasteful
injunctions that harm consumers, there are costs incidental to negotiating a
settlement. This cost can be especially burdensome in patent litigation
because bilateral monopolies 93 create a large bargaining range. 94 The wide
189. Thomas P. Lyon & Eric Rasmusen, Buyer-Option Contracts Restored: Renegotiation,
Inefficient Threats, and the Hold-Up Problem, 20 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 148, 150 (2004).
190. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 630
(2005).
191. Id.
192. FrC REPORT, supra note 3, at ch. 3, 40-41.
193. Bilateral monopoly exists when "two parties can deal only with each other." Walgreen




bargaining range exists because the holdup plaintiff will try to extract the
most lucrative settlement value possible, potentially just lower than the
expected result of litigation. However, the expected result of litigation can
be enormously high if an injunction is the anticipated remedy. In this case,
the plaintiff may seek an amount approaching the losses that the defendant
could avoid if there were no injunction. The defendant, on the other hand,
has an interest in paying as little as possible. If the plaintiff only asserts
the patent as a bargaining chip and has not suffered any harm beyond
expending the resources to prosecute its claim, the defendant may assume
that any settlement that the plaintiff receives above its costs of enforcing
the patent right will be appropriate. The settlement range in this instance
would be the plaintiff's cost of enforcing the patent as a lower bound and
the cost of the harm that would befall the defendant if an injunction issued
as an upper bound. This difference could be staggeringly large. As Judge
Posner has noted, "the costs of negotiating to a point within that range
may be high."' 95
However, private negotiations facilitated by injunctions as a means of
dealing with the costs of negotiating to a point within a large range are
often too quickly dismissed by those advocating for judicial valuation of
patent royalties. Commentators argue that whatever the costs imposed by
private negotiation of a patent license in the shadow of an injunction, it is
not clear that the alternative, judicially determined damages, is any bet-
ter.196 Professor Merges argues that even if transaction costs are high,
private negotiations in patent cases resulting from injunctions are prefer-
able to awarding damages because valuation of intellectual property can
be an intractable problem with which courts are not equipped to deal.' 97 If
true, holdup and the associated negotiation costs, though otherwise
problematic, would be necessary evils required to facilitate private nego-
tiations. Although commentators disagree on when and how frequently
private negotiations should be encouraged, in discussing holdup issues
they often overlook the benefits of private bargains in valuing intellectual
property.
In addition to considerations of negotiating and valuation costs gener-
ally, in order to achieve ex post allocative efficiency, categories of factual
circumstances where granting plaintiffs injunctions would lead to socially
suboptimal results must be identified and addressed. Though private bar-
gains may or may not be the best available means for parties to value a
patent in general, the real question is whether, as per specific plaintiffs,
denying the leverage of an injunction in bargaining would prevent the kind
195. Id.
196. See Robert P. Merges, Comment, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2664 (1994) (explaining that injunctions in IP cases are preferable to
court ordered damages because of the valuation problems associated with commercially deployed
intellectual assets); cf Sara Creek Prop. Co., 966 F.2d at 276 ("[P]rices and costs are more accu-
rately determined by the market than by government.").
197. Merges, supra note 196, at 2664.
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of inefficient transfers of wealth and social waste identified in the FTC
report.'9' If granting an injunction in specific instances would lead to so-
cially inefficient results, then the necessary smaller cost of valuation
through judicial damages proceeding in those instances may be justifiable
to prevent the larger cost associated with inefficient wealth transfer. Jus-
tice Kennedy recognized this concern in his concurring opinion and was
particularly troubled by "firms [that] use patents not as a basis for produc-
ing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing
fees."' 99 Justice Kennedy highlighted certain classes of plaintiffs that
abused injunctions by employing them "as a bargaining tool to charge ex-
orbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the
patent."2° A solution designed to ameliorate these holdup problems raised
by Justice Kennedy should, therefore, do so in a way narrowly tailored to
affect only holdup artists.
2. The Market Competition Requirement Addresses the Holdup Problem
and Eliminates Some of the Problems Associated with Holdup
At first pass, the market competition requirement moves individual liti-
gation outcomes closer to ex post efficiency by preventing holdup and its
ensuing costly transfers of wealth and negotiation costs, but only insofar
as courts have confidence that its application correctly "sorts" plaintiffs.
One way to view the market competition requirement is as a heuristic for
identifying the class of cases where the risk of socially wasteful holdup
might be most pressing. When applied to plaintiffs who have no good-faith
intention of practicing their invention and would not benefit from an in-
junction, it serves the dual function of reducing the holdup problem and
protecting consumers from the downstream effects of inefficient transfers
of wealth.' °  For market competitors, on the other hand, courts still issue
injunctions, preserving parties' ability to negotiate to a result in the mar-
ket. In this way, the market competition requirement can be seen as a
gatekeeper that lets through only those plaintiffs who would not engage in
socially costly holdup if they were awarded an injunction. Similarly, the
market competition requirement's demarcation of the class of entities that
are not market competitors may serve as a rough-and-ready judicial ap-
proximation of the patent troll, allowing courts to locate socially costly
injunctions before issuance, at low judicial cost. 2
198. See FTC REPORT, supra note 3, at 40-41.
199. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring)
200. Id.
201. See supra notes 192, 198 and accompanying text.
202. Cf Grab, supra note 2, at 113-14.
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3. Overinclusiveness of the Market Competition Requirement
and Effects on Competition May Offset Some of the
Ex Post Gains Achieved by Reducing
the Holdup Problem
Though the market competition requirement confers ex post social
benefits in the form of reducing some of the problems associated with
holdup, its overinclusiveness may mitigate the ex post gains. The market
competition requirement is an overinclusive categorization that may result
in inefficient transfer of wealth from small-scale inventors to established
firms, resulting in decreased competition.'O° The market competition re-
quirement withholds injunctions from plaintiffs that are not presently
market competitors without adequately weighing the intent of the plain-
tiff.204 For those plaintiffs that intend to practice their invention but have
not yet marketed it, the ex post justification for denying an injunction is
weaker. To account for this, one would have to subtract from the gains
achieved ex post the losses incurred through false negatives, which occur
when courts deny injunctions to plaintiffs who ultimately would have
commercially implemented their invention in a manner beneficial to con-25
sumers but were unable to do so because they lacked sufficient power to
enter the market without the injunction.2
The amount of this loss is entirely dependant on the frequency at
which would-be commercial competitors-those persons or entities that
have future plans or would otherwise end up competing in the future-are
stymied by the non-issuance of an injunction. The business model of pat-
ent licensing firms of buying, selling, and litigating patents means that this
group may contain few would-be competitors, so the number of false
negatives affecting this group is probably low. However, even with respect
to licensing firms, for each false negative where a court denies an injunc-
tion to a plaintiff that would not in fact have engaged in holdup, potential
losses associated with substituting judicial valuation for private negotia-
tion still exist. Individual small-scale inventors, as opposed to patent
licensing firms, may, more frequently, fall within the category of would-be
competitors. The risk of false negatives to this group, because they may
intend to compete in the future yet are likely to be ensnared by the market
competition requirement, is more prominent. One specific area of concern,
brought to the fore by Justice Thomas, is the need to protect "self-made
203. See id.
204. See z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 444 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (deny-
ing an injunction to z4 amid arguments and evidence that z4 had exerted tremendous effort to
commercialize its patent, and failed only because of Microsoft's infringement).
205. For example, the inventions could have benefited consumers by providing competition
that reduced prices or by providing superior goods or services.
206. A related, similar loss occurs when a court incorrectly classifies a market-competing
plaintiff (or indeed any plaintiff) as a party who would use an injunction as a holdup device and then
denies that party an injunction.
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inventors" who "prefer to license their patents. 'z 7 Justice Thomas's warn-
ing against a categorical denial of injunctions to "self-made inventors"
shows that the market competition requirement can produce casualties if
not applied with great care.2 8 Therefore, any analysis must account for the
ex post loss contributed by impeding individual inventors and other
would-be competitors.
By impeding would-be market competitors, the market competition re-
quirement increases ex post losses due to monopoly. A would-be
competitor could include, for example, a self-made inventor that was on
the wrong end of the market competition requirement, or an actual patent
troll that, while fitting the description of troll today, would actually have
implemented the invention in the future. Would-be competitors cannot
obtain an injunction under the market competition requirement because•. 209
their current conduct does not include market competition. When the
market competition requirement prevents a would-be competitor from en-
tering the market because of an inability to adequately protect an
invention, the result is a ratification of the market status quo. At its worst,
the market competition requirement may be an antidote to the holdup
problem that is itself a poison because the result is a transfer of wealth
from small-scale inventors to established market competitors.2 "' This is the
corollary to the holdup problem, where established market competitors
transfer wealth to individual inventors and licensing firms. Transfer of
wealth from would-be competitors to established corporate entities is
problematic because it reduces competition by creating barriers to entry
for new competitors.2 ' This transfer results in dead weight ex post lossS• 212
due to monopoly pricing. Such a result runs contrary to the underlying
policy, on which antitrust legislation operates, namely that competition isS • 213
required for the benefit of consumers and business. Therefore, this lossis particularly dangerous because it can exacerbate socially inefficient
207. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1840 (2006).
208. See id. For example, cardiologist Jan K. Voda was denied an injunction for his invention
of a medical device. See Complaint, supra note 84.
209. But cf Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Organisation v. Buffalo Tech. Inc.,
492 F. Supp. 2d 600, 600-02 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (granting an injunction to an Australian government
run research institution that previously had been a market competitor in its inventive area although it
was not at the time of the opinion, but it was a competitor in the market of ideas and scientific minds
at the time of the opinion).
210. The transfer of wealth entails the established competitor achieving a larger share of the
markct than otherwise would have been possible if the would-be small scale inventor had success-
fully been able to penetrate the market and capture some of the share.
211. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) ("Mo-
nopoly power is the power to control prices or exclude competition.").
212. Maureen A. O'Rourke, Shaping Competition on the Internet: Who Owns Product and
Pricing Information?, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1965, 1968 (2000) (arguing that the monopolist may "price
above marginal cost, imposing deadweight losses on consumers").
213. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 174
(2005) ("Antitrust's purpose is to promote competition, which it does by encouraging competitive
market structures and intervening selectively when practices pose a genuine threat to competition.").
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markets devoid of meaningful competition to the detriment of both con-
214 211sumers and scientific progress.
Given the dynamic nature of ex post costs, an opportunity exists for
district courts to exercise their discretion to minimize the negative impact
of the market competition requirement. Costs attributed to impeding
would-be competitors relative to the state of affairs pre-eBay might be jus-
tified ex post if, after accounting for these losses, the net result is positive
and is the best possible means of addressing the holdup problem. Dis-
trict courts should apply the market competition requirement with great
care to avoid false negatives. Indeed, rather than trolling for trolls based
on the single dimension of market competition, it would be more prudent
for district courts to expand their factual analysis to watch out for entities
who, while having a superficial resemblance to a holdup artist, would not
in fact be at high risk of engaging in holdup. Courts could accomplish this,
for example, by considering a wider range of factors when conducting ir-
reparable injury and inadequacy of damages analysis such as the plaintiff's
prior efforts, ongoing attempts and future plans to market the invention,
past licensing practice, and other commercial activity in the same sector
but not covering the patent. Commonwealth Scientific, though a very
unique set of facts, may be a positive development, as the court noted that
the plaintiff had engaged in successful commercialization activities in the
past before ultimately granting an injunction.2 " Applied in this way, the
market competition requirement may increase ex post allocative efficiency
versus pre-eBay. If, on the other hand, district courts continue along their
current trajectory of rigidly applying the market competition requirement
without weighing the consequences, a legitimate risk exists that losses
from the market competition requirement will overshadow all the benefits
that were to flow from combating patent trolls.
B. The Market Competition Requirement Endangers Ex Ante Productive
Efficiency and Diminishes Incentives to Innovate
Even if substantial gains ex post exist upon application of the market
competition requirement, the reduction in ex ante productive efficiency
that is likely to occur as a result of decreased incentives to innovate may
214. PHILLIP AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST ANALYSIS I I (6th ed. 2004); Thomas G. Krattenmaker
& Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs To Achieve Power over Price, 96
YALE L.J. 209, 279 (1986) ("An increase in price, caused by the exercise of market power, harms con-
sumers ... [through the] unambiguously harmful 'deadweight' loss of sales occasioned by the shift
from the lower, more competitive price.").
215. Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91
MINN. L. REV. 101, 179 (2006) (discussing how monopolists may exclude competitors by asserting
invalid patents, resulting in deadweight loss and reduced innovation).
216. Other solutions to the holdup problem resulting from injunctions have also been offered,
including the proposal by Professors Ayres and Madison to award inalienable injunctions that render
settlement after injunction impossible. Ayres & Madison, supra note 1, at 72-78.
217. See supra note 54.
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offset these gains to the point that courts should avoid application of the
market competition requirement. The market competition requirement's
substantive impact is that it changes the distribution of remedies granted to
successful plaintiffs. Whereas pre-eBay, courts, in essence, granted injunc-
tions to all plaintiffs upon finding infringement of a valid patent,2 8 the
market competition requirement confines the availability of the injunctive
remedy to market competitors. 2' 9 Those plaintiffs that do not receive in-
junctions receive judicially fixed damages. The inability of the class of
noncompeting plaintiffs to access injunctive relief, despite having shown
infringement of their valid patent, may adversely affect incentives to inno-
vate due to the importance of injunctive relief to patent holders. This
Section explores how the market competition requirement may decrease
ex ante incentives to innovate, examines the adverse effect the market
competition requirement may have on small-scale inventors, and con-
cludes that risks to productive efficiency counsel against the continued use
of the market competition requirement.
The Constitution grants Congress the power to "promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discover-
ies. ' 2 0 This limited power requires maintaining a careful balance between
the need to provide adequate incentives for innovation while ensuring that
2211the cost to the public is the minimum necessary to achieve those ends.
As the Supreme Court has expressed, "Patents are not given as favors ....
but are meant to encourage invention by rewarding the inventor with the
right .. . to exclude others from the use of his invention.... But in re-
warding useful invention, the 'rights and welfare of the community must
be fairly dealt with and effectually guarded.' ,222
Attempts to improve the ex post results in patent litigation must not
occur at the expense of the public, who are the beneficiaries of properly
incentivized innovation and scientific progress. Federal courts adjudicat-
ing patent disputes have embraced this perspective in holding that
achievement of the constitutional purpose of incentivizing innovation for
the benefit of the public is not possible without the aid of injunctive re-
lief.223 In Smith International, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., the Federal Circuit
stated that "[w]ithout this injunctive power of the courts, the right to ex-
218. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
219. See supra Section 1.D and Part I1.
220. U.S. CONST. art. ., § 8, cl. 8.
221. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964) (describing the strict
prerequisites to obtaining a patent and the strict enforcement on the limitations on the exercise of a
patent after it has been issued).
222. Id. (quoting Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322, 329 (1858)).
223. Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 996 (1983); see also Applera Corp. v. MJ Research Inc., 389 F. Supp. 2d 365, 366-
67 (D. Conn. 2005) (citing Smith Int'l, 718 F2d at 1577-78); A & H Sportswear Co. v. Victoria's
Secret Stores, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 1457, 1475 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (same).
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clude granted by the patent would be diminished, and the express purpose
of the Constitution and Congress, to promote the progress of the useful
arts, would be seriously undermined. 224 The market competition require-
ment may be a reasonable attempt to promote social welfare from an ex
post perspective, but to the extent that withholding the injunctive remedy
detrimentally affects incentives to develop technologies and the platforms
to utilize them, it fails to meet the quid pro quo required by the Constitu-
tion.
Commentators have argued that solutions aimed at reducing the prob-
lems of holdup ex post are therefore inadequate unless they account for
the ex ante effects. Professor Elhauge, commenting on courts' general and
erroneous practice of weighing the costs and benefits of monopolies only
ex post, states the problem as follows:
[T]he monopoly loss that results from the exclusion of rivals is an ex
post loss that exists only if we compare it to a baseline that assumes the
invention was made in the first place. But we get to that baseline only if
225there are adequate ex ante incentives to innovate ....
"Small" decreases in ex ante incentives to innovate manifest them-
selves in enormous loss because they result in the non-production of the
innovation in question in the first place, completely precluding the possi-
bility of any social gains accruing from this innovation ex post.
226
Similarly, the market competition requirement produces good results only
if one adopts the assumption that once innovators take notice of the re-
quirement, they will continue to invent with the same enthusiasm and
fervor as they did before the rule existed. 7 This assumption, however, is
likely to be false.
The market competition requirement results in far fewer injunctions,
which in turn results in lower expected values for patents and diminished
incentives to innovate. 22s The Federal Circuit has adopted the position that
without the ability to obtain injunctive relief, "the right to exclude granted
to the patentee would have only a fraction of the value it was intended to
have, and would no longer be as great an incentive to engage in the toils of
scientific and technological research. '229 The principle that patents have
reduced value if not enforceable through injunction has been adopted
by federal district courts and continues to be viable post-eBay as
224. Smith Int'l, 718 F.2d at 1577-78.
225. Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REv. 253, 301
(2003).
226. Id. at 302 (arguing that there would be no ex post allocative efficiency if the diminution
in profits deters investment in innovation).
227. See id. at 301 ("[O]nce judicial decisions ... create such a legal risk of compulsory patent
licensing, that risk would apply to all future innovations that might get patented by any firm.").
228. Merges, supra note 196, at 2667 (quoting Smith Int'l, 718 F.2d at 1577).
229. Smith Int'l, 718 F.2d at 1578.
230. E.g., Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 397 F. Supp. 2d 537, 547 (D.
Del. 2005); Wesley Jessen Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 209 F Supp. 2d 348, 403 n.12 (D. Del.
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i,231well. With the average value of patents depressed, innovators will not
232pursue at least some socially useful inventions on the margin 3. Those en-
tities that recognize themselves as falling squarely within the crosshairs of
the losing end of the market competition requirement-i.e., patent licens-
ing firms and "self-made inventors"-will likely place a particularly low
value on their patents and will have especially low incentives to innovate.
It is virtually certain, therefore, that the market competition requirement
will deter at least some socially useful inventions that these groups other-
wise would have created. The specific amount of innovation that is
deterred is an empirical question that is beyond the scope of this Note.
However, it is instructive to note that federal courts and commentators
have argued that removal of the injunctive remedy is likely to have sub-
233
stantial effects on innovation.
Post-eBay district court cases illustrate how the judicially determined
damages remedy may be inadequate to protect innovation incentives as
compared to an injunction. When post-eBay courts deny injunctions, they
234allow the defendant's infringing conduct to continue. Courts determine
the damages for the past and future infringement based on a "reasonable
royalty" approximating the revenues that plaintiff would have received had
the plaintiff and the infringer entered into a license agreement with rea-
235sonable terms. Commonly, courts order the infringing defendant to file
reports with the court, so they may adjust damages based on reasonable
236royalty if the level of infringement changes with future conduct.
Damages based on reasonable royalty implicate the concern that incen-
tives to innovate will diminish under the market competition requirement
because damages may systematically undervalue the reasonable royalty
that the plaintiff is entitled to for future infringement.237 Fact-finders, in
setting the royalty rate, have the unenviable task of replicating a value
reached in negotiation between plaintiff and defendant, while also valuat-
ing abstract technological concepts. Therefore, courts cannot reach a• - 238
reasonable royalty with scientific precision. While one might think thaterrors in setting the royalty rate will net out, averaging to a value close to
2002) (citing Smith Int'l, 718 F.2d at 1577-78); Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-
Plough Corp., 106 F. Supp. 2d 696, 703-04 (D.N.J. 2000) (same).
231. Novartis Corp. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., Nos. 04-4473, 06-1130, 2007 WL 1695689, at
*31 (D.N.J. June 11, 2007) (citing Smith Int'l, 718 F.2d at 1577-78); Telequip Corp. v. Change
Exch., No. 5:01-CV- 1748, 2006 WL 2385425, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2006) (same).
232. Merges, supra note 196, at 2667.
233. See supra notes 228-230 and accompanying text.
234. Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1513-L, 2006 WL 2570614, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 5,
2006); z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 E Supp. 2d 437, 444 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (expressly
noting that the court-created damages remedy would need to be crafted to respond to "Microsoft's
continuing post-verdict infringement of z4's patents").
235. Voda, 2006 WL 2570614, at * 1; z4 , 434 F. Supp. 2d at 441-42,444.
236. Voda, 2006 WL 2570614, at *6; z4, 434 E Supp. 2d at 444.
237. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
238. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 68 (2007) ("[O]nly rarely can a
court determine the value of competing uses accurately.").
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what the parties would have agreed to in negotiations, commentators have
argued that judicially determined damages awarded to enforce property
rights tend to be undercompensatory and will not provide the same in-
centives to innovate ex ante as a patentee's ability to license on their own
terms, or not at all.
Plaintiffs, especially small-scale inventors, will not have the leverage
to negotiate adequate compensation if judicially determined royalties are,
on the average, systematically undercompensatory, absent an injunction.
The court, for example, awarded the "reasonable royalty" of 7.5% of the
defendant's gross sales of the infringing devices to the plaintiff in Voda, a
doctor who had patented improvements on a medical catheter.2 4 This enti-
tled Dr. Voda to a stream of revenue based on the quantity of infringing
devices that the defendant sold multiplied by the royalty rate set by the
court. What it did not entitle Dr. Voda to, though, was the ability to collect
more than 7.5% of the revenue, as the royalty rate found by the court
would impose a de facto ceiling on a privately negotiated royalty rate that
might be reached post-trial. If some percentage above 7.5% of the sales by
defendant were attributable to Dr. Voda's improvement, Dr. Voda would
have been left undercompensated with no recourse. Had the court awarded
Dr. Voda an injunction, however, he could have attempted to negotiate a
higher royalty as part of a license and simply refused to license the tech-
nology if agreement from the defendant was not forthcoming.
To be sure, both winners and losers exist under the market competition
requirement, but the incentives of the losers may be particularly sensitive
to the market competition requirement. The "losers" are those for whom
application of the market competition requirement results in a decrease in
ex ante incentives to innovate, namely individual inventors and patent li-
censing entities. It may be relatively easy for an entity to predict that, as
per an inventive area, the court will not perceive them as being a market
competitor since district court cases have fleshed out the rule with a fair
amount of clarity, meaning that they can predict being a loser under the
market competition requirement. An entity that recognizes itself as losing
under the market competition requirement, therefore, may be sensitive to
its inability to exclude potential competitors. The "winners" are those for
whom application of the market competition requirement results in an in-
crease in ex ante incentives to innovate, namely corporations. The
winners' ex ante incentives are increased only to the extent that some in-
novation was previously deterred ex ante by the threat of ex post holdup. 4'
239. See id. at 69 (discussing the objection to liability rules that courts are likely to systemati-
cally underestimate damages due to the fact that plaintiffs carry the burden of proof for damages
issues, and defendants contrary speculative evidence is allowed); supra note 196 and accompanying
text.
240. Voda, 2006 WL 2570614, at * 1.
241. See FTC REPORT, supra note 3, at ch. 3, 41 ("[1]nnovation may suffer because some
companies will 'refrain from introducing certain products for fear of hold-up.'" (quoting Carl
Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, in I
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 126 (Adam Jaffe et al. eds., 2001))). The increase in
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An entity will have greater difficulty, however, predicting ex ante that an
inventive area in which they are considering investment is likely to harbor
future threats of patent holdup, meaning that the winners may not be able
to appreciate the potential incentive increase ex ante. Therefore, incentives
for the losers may be more sensitive to the effects of the market competi-
tion requirement than the winners.
Available data bolsters the proposition that, because individuals are re-
sponsible for a high degree of patent innovation, it is important that we
calibrate incentives to an appropriate level. A study by the National
Science Foundation ranked individuals behind only business entities as the
242largest constituency responsible for innovation through patenting. Data
reveals that in the United States in 2005, the PTO granted 10,358 patents
243to individuals, and 65,207 patents to U.S. corporations. Indeed, this may
be an optimistic demography of groups potentially affected by the market
competition requirement since many patent licensing firms are incorpo-
rated. Given the high amount of patent activity taking place in the
demographic group most adversely affected by the market competition
requirement, it is risky to assume that increased ex ante incentives enjoyed
by the corporate constituency and gains ex post can compensate for ex
ante losses of productive efficiency, especially given concerns regarding
the existence of ex post gains.
CONCLUSION
Consistent application in the first twenty-five district court cases post-
eBay strongly suggests that the market competition requirement is becom-
ing an entrenched doctrine at the district court level. However, the
divergent legal standards used by district courts turning on status as a
market competitor are in tension with the Supreme Court's unanimous
holding that courts should not apply eBay's four-factor test in a manner
that makes the injunctive remedy unavailable based on broad classifica-
tions. Contrary to the Supreme Court's holding, the market competition
requirement does create a broad class of plaintiffs for whom injunctions
are not obtainable. Categorical denial of injunctions to patent-holders that
do not market their invention is undesirable not only because it goes
against the letter of the eBay opinion, but because it is bad policy as well.
ex ante incentives for the group of winners may be small given the fact that corporate entities have
access to markets giving them ample commercial incentives to innovate already. Any gain realized
by a particular market-competing entity would be further mitigated, if not eliminated, because it too
could be denied injunctions under the market competition requirement if not competing in the mar-
ket in the inventive area covered by the patent in question.
242. NAT'L Sci. BD., NAT'L Sci. FOUND., SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING: INDICATORS 2000, at
7-20 (2000), available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seindOO/pdf/c7/cO7.pdf (noting that individu-
als own at least twenty percent of all U.S. patents, to say nothing of the number patents that
individuals are responsible for filing).
243. PATENT TECH. MONITORING BRANCH, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING BY
ORGANIZATIONs: 2005, at Al-I (2006), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/
taf/topo_05.pdf.
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The market competition requirement addresses some of the problems re-
sulting from holdup, but the collateral damage is high. The market
competition requirement may decrease both competition and incentives to
innovate for individual "self-made" inventors, who form a substantial con-
stituency that drives a large segment of patenting activity. The combined
effect of the loss in competition when courts deny injunctions to would-be
competitors and losses due to decreased incentives to innovate raises seri-
ous questions about the wisdom of continued application of the market
competition requirement.
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